The destruction of cultural heritage in Syria and Iraq by the group calling itself Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (Islamic State) is neither random collateral damage nor necessarily an exercise in barbarism. It is targeted and ideologically explicable. It represents a core feature of Islamic State's strategic design. Strategy, in this context, refers to the 'use of available resources to gain any objective'.
The destruction of cultural heritage in Syria and Iraq by the group calling itself Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (Islamic State) is neither random collateral damage nor necessarily an exercise in barbarism. It is targeted and ideologically explicable. It represents a core feature of Islamic State's strategic design. Strategy, in this context, refers to the 'use of available resources to gain any objective'. 1 In conditions of armed conflict, strategy denotes how actions affect one's enemy. This understanding provides a foundation upon which outcomes in war may be evaluated. However, not all outcomes in war are defined solely in relation to the enemy combatant. In circumstances where the objective is to influence a different or wider audience, 'strategy must adjust to the audience rather than assume that the application of force will be universally understood in terms of its effect against the enemy '. 2 This study will show how the destruction of cultural artefacts aims at a much broader target than the heritage itself.
In assessing the strategic intent of Islamic State's approach to cultural heritage sites, it is necessary to locate this analysis within the strategic literature. In this context, iconoclasm, as a strategy, represents a logical and instrumental means of employing violence to achieve political ends. The first section of this article therefore identifies the independent variables necessary to effect the application of strategy to cultural heritage and to achieve the objectives of Islamic State. To illuminate key questions surrounding the destruction of heritage in order to achieve political objectives, the analysis applies principles first enunciated in the early nineteenth century by Carl von Clausewitz in On war. The argument here is that the practice of iconoclasm provides a framework within which to understand a strategy of cultural destruction. The article further contends that strategic iconoclasm is manifested when three independent variables are present and interconnected: namely, the degradation and delegitimization of the existing social and cultural fabric; the removal of all reference to a previous society or culture; and an attempt to reconstruct society in keeping with a new totalitarian vision or ideology.
We shall accordingly examine whether Islamic State's treatment of cultural heritage exhibits this trinity of factors. To test for the presence of these variables, International Affairs 93: 5, 2017 three case-studies will be assessed: the destruction of the ancient city of Palmyra; the demolition of Sufi, Shi'a and Sunni shrines generally; and the destruction of sites in the city of Mosul. The analysis reveals that the manner in which Islamic State addresses cultural heritage exhibits one of two tendencies: pragmatism in order to extract the most political value out of heritage sites; or dogmatism in accordance with its political, religious and ideological perspective. The final sections evaluate the case-study evidence through the lens of strategic theory. The resulting analysis shows whether the trinity is manifest in the cases studied and the utility of such a strategy for those seeking to implement the Islamic State vision.
Clausewitz and culture
For western and many non-western observers, the destruction of cultural heritage in conflict zones is ethically and politically unjustifiable. Francesco Rutelli, former Italian Minister of Culture and Tourism, argued that the designation of places such as Palmyra as World Heritage Sites by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) represented 'a victory of the culture of the West ... until the rude awakening at the hands of the ISIS cutthroats. The cutthroats who reinvented, within the framework of a profound conflict within Islam, systematic iconoclasm.' 3 The identification and denunciation of cultural barbarism, however, provide only a partial explanation of the phenomenon. Strategic theory illustrates how 'iconoclasm' operates as a functional tool that explains why heritage is targeted in conflict zones.
In On war, Clausewitz noted: 'Even the ultimate outcome of war is not always to be regarded as final. The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date.' 4 Taking this observation to its theoretical extreme, Clausewitz argues that there is no definitive end to war, for there is always the possibility of conflict resuming when political conditions change. Indeed, the potential for a resumption of hostilities is inherent in any resistance to a new political order. 5 Similarly, a singular act of will against the new political order, which may be as seemingly insignificant as an unarmed demonstrator's defiance of an oncoming tank, or the throwing of stones at soldiers of occupation, exhibits an intrinsic political meaning. 6 Such acts of resistance, no matter how minor, may be harbingers of more organized violence. From these reflections, two questions arise: what gives resistance its capacity to become active in the first place? And is it conceivable, theoretically, that resistance can be completely suppressed? To answer the International Affairs 93: 5, 2017 first question requires insight into the individual mind of the rebel; to answer the second requires determining whether it is possible to change, or conquer, the mind of every individual who might conceivably adopt an adversarial stance. 7 It is within this context, as we shall show, that a strategy of iconoclasm functions.
The widespread destruction of buildings in Bosnia in the 1990s affords a relatively recent example of the attempt to wage war on the opponent's mind. Martin Coward suggests that the assault on the built environment constituted an attack on the identities of the communities that owned or shared them. 8 Embodying community values over time, the built environment becomes a logical target in the context of ethno-nationalist wars, symbolizing the culture to be eliminated. 9 Thus, targeting the physical space represents the endeavour to change the nature of a community in order to 'erase its existence and/or prevent the possibility of its (continued) existence '. 10 From this perspective, the fighting in Bosnia during Yugoslavia's wars of dissolution witnessed Croatian forces attempting to alter the existing social fabric by removing all reference to its former political condition. For example, Mostar's 500-year-old bridge, Stari Most, long connected the ethnic Croat and Bosnian Muslim parts of the town. A significant heritage artefact, it symbolized the broader ethno-religious plurality of Bosnia prior to the wars of dissolution. First constructed in the sixteenth century, the bridge was pivotal to trade and transport across the Ottoman empire. The passage of different peoples through Mostar gave rise over time to a distinctive, syncretic, ethno-cultural Bosnian identity conducive to the peaceful cohabitation of heterogeneous communities. The bridge symbolized this pluralist culture.
11 Therefore, the destruction of the bridge represented the rejection of a heterogeneous identity, delegitimizing what had gone before, while simultaneously authenticating the message of ethnic exclusivity promulgated by the Croatian leadership. As Riedlmayer observes, by 1993 the bridge served no strategic value, having already been damaged beyond use, but its obliteration served to eradicate the 'collective memory' of what the bridge signified. 12 Yet in November that year the Bosnian Croat Army shelled what remained of the structure until it collapsed into the River Neretva. 13 The act of destruction was entirely symbolic. The then President of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, advocated the creation of the statelet of 'Herceg-Bosna' as a home for Bosnian Croats, with Mostar as its capital. For this to happen Tudjman wanted the town 'cleansed' of non-Croatians.
14 The consequence of Tudjman's ethno-nationalist vision was the 7 Smith, 'Quantum strategy', pp. 10-13. forced flight of Bosnian Muslims from western Mostar into the ghettoized east, which the Croatians then subjected to siege and bombardment. 15 The destruction of the Stari Most represents what Rambelli and Reinders call a concerted attempt at 'total obliteration'. 16 Riedlmayer's account of the broader campaign of destruction in Bosnia estimates that over 1,000 mosques, hundreds of Catholic churches and scores of Orthodox churches, monasteries, private and public libraries, archives, and museums were shelled, burned, and dynamited, and in many cases even the ruins were removed by nationalist extremists in order to complete the cultural and religious 'cleansing' of the land they had seized.
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Presenting data from the Institute for Protection of Cultural, Historical and Natural Heritage of Bosnia Herzegovina, he demonstrated that between 1992 and 1995 over 80 per cent of congressional mosques, 46 per cent of small local mosques, 48 per cent of shrines and mausolea, and 30 per cent of buildings erected through religious endowments had been attacked. 18 Consequently, by burning the documents, by razing houses of worship and bulldozing graveyards, the nationalists who overran and 'cleansed' hundreds of towns and villages in Bosnia were trying to insure themselves against the possibility that the people expelled and dispossessed might one day return to reclaim their homes and properties.
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Any attempt to change people's minds, forcibly or otherwise, requires a process of escalation. As Clausewitz observed, 'if the enemy is to be coerced you must place him in a situation that is even more unpleasant than the sacrifice you call on him to make. The hardships of that situation must of course not be transient-at least not in appearance.' 20 Yet simply placing an enemy in an unpleasant situation is not to conquer, or even to change the opponent's mind. The potential for dissent and resistance remains inherent in any situation that does not result in the absolute obliteration of every facet of the enemy. The escalatory tendency in war always pushes in this direction.
An earlier twentieth-century example evinces this tendency. The Nazi occupation of Warsaw in the Second World War saw, at the outset of hostilities, the Luftwaffe target the city's historic sites, as the Nazis considered them representative of Jewish and Slavic culture that required obliteration. Following the occupation of the city the Reich deployed the Verbrennungs-und Vernichtungskommando-burning and destruction detachments-tasked with enacting the Nazi lawyer Hans Frank's edict that 'Warsaw will get what it deserves-complete annihilation'. 21 The Nazi destruction of Warsaw was neither opportunistic nor simply collateral damage but central to the policy of Lebensraum, which envisioned a neue deutsche Stadt Warschau ('new German city of Warsaw'). In keeping with the Pabst Plan for Warsaw, the intention was to reconstruct the city by replicating the architectural ideals of other German provincial towns according to design principles that determined everything from street cleaning to transport systems in order to rebuild Warsaw as a 'model city'.
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The subsequent internment of the Jews and other 'decadent' elements of the city's population in ghettos anticipated the final solution with its aim of extinguishing all opposition to Nazi rule. As Einwohner noted, a population that was 'isolated, politically powerless and targeted for extermination by a powerful regime' could not be expected to mount any collective resistance. 23 However, the Jewish ghetto uprising of 1943 demonstrated otherwise. Interestingly, Einwohner argued that the uprising might not have happened if the conditions inside the ghettos had not been so dire. Paradoxically, it was only when the interned realized the hopelessness of their situation that they planned resistance. Moreover, the realization 'facilitated the construction of a motivational frame that equated resistance with honor and dignity'. 24 Such resistance intimates that all sides have agency within war. As Clausewitz maintained: 'War is not the action of a living force upon a lifeless mass but always a collision of two living forces.' 25 Just because you expect an adversary to conform to your coercion does not necessarily mean they will. The Nazis may well have believed that interning the residents of Warsaw in ghettos and systematically changing the DNA of the urban environment would render any further resistance futile. What they did not anticipate was that people with nothing to lose were not necessarily going to accept the destiny the Nazis had predetermined for them. If the death camps were the residents' ultimate fate, then fighting to die with honour and dignity would be no worse than dying at Treblinka or Auschwitz. The result of this Nazi miscalculation was that the ghetto-dwellers escalated the conflict by revolting. It might be argued that the architects of the uprising also miscalculated by overescalating the conflict against a clearly stronger opponent with little prospect of success. The Nazis were ideologically prepared to exterminate the inhabitants of the ghetto no matter what the cost. Himmler's response to the uprising elucidated the point: 'The city must completely disappear from the surface of the earth and serve only as a transport station for the Wehrmacht. No stone can remain standing. Every stone must be razed to its foundation.' 26 In suppressing the uprising the Nazis destroyed the city's major cultural and religious sites, including the Bruhl and Saxon Palaces, the churches of Sts Alexander, John, Mary, Kazimierz, Hyacinth and Martin, and historic collections of Jewish manuscripts. The uprising, however, was the catalyst, not the cause, of the destruction. the Germans to escalate a process of cultural obliteration to destroy the city and then remake it on Nazi principles-a policy they already had in mind. The Nazis, in other words, embarked on a deliberate strategy of iconoclasm: cultural destruction. It is to the character of this understanding that we next turn.
Iconoclasm as a strategy
The etymology of the noun 'iconoclasm' has enjoyed a complex history, and presents definitional difficulties because the term is essentially contestable. 27 Its principal reference is religious. The notion is premised on a contested view of the primacy of the role an image plays in a culture or a religion. This compound of two Greek words, eikon and klasma (to break), implies that iconoclasm denotes the rejection and destruction of cherished beliefs and images. It does not necessarily connote a negative value judgement. As studies by Patrick Collinson, David Freedberg and Marshall G. Hodgson have demonstrated in different ways, iconoclasm transmogrifies into a form of iconophobia, a distrust of all images that becomes an accepted cultural attitude premised on religious value and the fear of false idols. 28 However, the historic practice of iconomachy (hostility to images) within monotheistic religions has in the post-religious West, as Francesco Rutelli's usage cited above shows, assumed a pejorative connotation. Consequently, UNESCO usage equates iconoclasm with barbarism.
This modern secular usage, nevertheless, is somewhat incoherent. Thus, both the 2001 destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan by the Afghan Taliban and the 2003 toppling of Saddam Hussein's statue in Baghdad's Firdos Square might be considered explicit acts of iconoclasm. Yet to label them as such does not necessarily imply a moral valuation. To judge one barbaric and the other heroic would constitute a category mistake: that is, confusing things of one kind and presenting them as something else. 29 Both acts destroyed icons of a previous idolatrous era, Jahiliya (pre-Islamic) and Ba'athist respectively. Without value judgements, there is no difference between the iconoclastic acts.
In this regard, the term 'iconoclasm', like 'terrorism', has become value-laden. The terms of its historical and etymological emergence contribute a further layer of semantic difficulty. James Noyes, for instance, argues that the term 'iconoclast' first entered the European lexicon in 1595 as a result of the spread of Calvinism across the continent. 30 Even so, the practice of iconoclasm can be identified in eighth-century Arabia, when, in the wake of the Ummayad siege of Constantinople (717 ce) by Caliph Suleyman, the Byzantine emperor Leo III first introduced a series of eikon klasmic edicts between 726 and 729 ce banning the worship 27 of images. The application of the same terms to entirely different historical and cultural contexts highlights the need to exercise care when associating universal judgements with particular words, especially as the term 'iconoclasm' does not have an Arabic equivalent.
Despite these semantic caveats the term, parsimoniously applied, does possess explanatory utility. Simply put, iconoclasm is the breaking of images, idols or icons for a political and/or religious purpose. This might entail its use as a particular tactic within a broader campaign of violence. There is, moreover, a further dimension to iconoclasm that transforms it into strategy. Such a strategic appraisal of the practice of iconoclasm requires that the evaluation of the means and ends the iconoclast seeks to use and achieve is not affected by preconceived values.
From this perspective, the Nazi occupation of Warsaw, through systematic heritage destruction, altering the fabric of society by changing the population demographic, and centralization of power, in order to create the neue deutsche Stadt Warschau, exhibited all the elements of the concept of iconoclasm. Furthermore, all the constituent elements were contingent on one another, but consistent in creating the interlocking effect required to produce a logic of iconoclasm. An analogous logic may be identified in the Balkan conflict of the 1990s. The Croat forces destroyed secular and symbolic heritage, and altered the composition of society through segregation and ghettoization, for the purpose of turning Mostar into the capital of a newly formed statelet of Herceg-Bosna. Accordingly, three linked variables must be present for the manifestation of iconoclasm as a strategic logic: first, the degradation and delegitimization of the existing societal fabric; second, the removal of all reference to the previous society; and finally, the reconstruction of society in keeping with a new ideology or political religion. Although not necessarily appearing in a sequential process, all must be present in some form if a coherent strategy of iconoclasm is to be identified.
Jihadism and iconoclasm
Before analysing Islamic State's strategy of iconoclasm it is necessary to consider the logic of iconoclasm within the context of the ideology, or political religion, which Islamic State professes. 31 This has been the subject of recent scholarly debate. 32 Central to this debate is the extent to which Islamic State's thinking represents a form of Salafi jihadism or a distinctively modern formatting of Islam to fashion a distinctively millennial homo islamicus. 33 gates the strict replication of the life of the Prophet Muhammad and his rightly guided followers, the Rashidun, in contemporary practice. Sunni Salafi jihadism may be differentiated from non-violent forms of Salafism, according to Quintan Wiktorowicz, in that it deems the current geopolitical climate to require violent revolutionary jihad in order to restore religious practice to the rightly guided path. 35 Crucial to Salafist belief is the notion of tawhid, the unity of God. Tawhid amalgamates three concepts: tawhid al-rububiyya, the oneness of Lordship, or the belief that one God is the creator of all (monotheism as opposed to polytheism); tawhid al-asma wa-l-sifat, oneness of names, qualities and attributes, meaning that God is supreme and unique (the rejection of secularism); tawhid al-uluhiyya, oneness of worship, meaning that God alone has the right to be worshipped. 36 It is the last of these three concepts that transforms Islam into a living idealand, in its Salafi jihadist recension, requires action, because 'god requires affirmative acts to confirm belief and ... this characteristic is what distinguishes a Muslim'. 37 Shiraz Maher argues that in simply stating one's belief in Islam and recognizing God as a unified deity, a Muslim fulfils the requirements only of tawhid al-rububiyya and tawhid al-asma wa-l-sifat; tawhid al-uluhiyya remains unfulfilled because God is not actively worshipped. A Muslim who is 'passive' is 'un-practising' and thus heterodox. Faith necessitates 'affirmative action'. 38 Drawing on the work of Abdullah Azzam, Maher further claims that positive acts are necessary for tawhid al-uluhiyya and can only be sustained through 'stances taken in life'. 39 Gilles Keppel similarly identifies an emerging jihadist dialectic combining the search for 'an all encompassing conception of Islam inspired by the Salafism of the Arabian peninsula and a fervent consultation of a digital "Islamosphere" full of norms and injunctions breaking with the "infidel" model of the West'. 40 Contrasting its alternative lifestyle with generalized 'misbelief ', strict Salafism reserves salvation for an 'elect alone'. 41 It thus demands affirmative action to prevent shirk (idolatry). Shirk, moreover, is the basis of Islamic State's hostility to any idolatrous reverence of the past, particularly of the pre-Islamic Jahiliya era.
Notwithstanding these claims, it is evident that Islamic State and its precursor, Al-Qaeda, adopt distinctively heterodox approaches to charismatic leaders, martyrs, venerated personages and apocalyptic violence that sit uneasily with even the strictest readings of orthodox Sunni Salafism. As Faisal Devji shows, 'the jihad abandons the authorities and the heartlands of Islam by taking to the peripheries assuming there a charismatic, mystical and even heretical countenance that dismembers the old social and religious distinctions of Islam'. 42 Analogously, Olivier Roy observes, the jihadists find a better translation of their approach to 35 violence, sex and death in Islamic State's 'religious terms than in Salafism which is more puritanical and less fascinated by violence'. 43 The contemporary jihadist, although not necessarily unsympathetic to Salafism, is a distinctly post-modern figure practising a nomadism that leaves the real world behind for a 'jihadi imaginary'. 44 In this context its cult of martyrdom and violence fits within 'a very modern aesthetics of heroism and violence'. 45 Significantly, the techniques of reality television inform Islamic State's videos. Indeed, the jihad's world of 'reference is far more connected to the dreams and nightmares of the media than it is to any traditional school of Islamic jurisprudence'. 46 Moreover, the jihadist's fascination with death and martyrdom is linked to an apocalyptic discourse that is absent from Sunni legalism. Islamic State's conviction 'that the end of the world is near' is both central and new. As a result it assumes that 'there is no other perspective than war and total ... victory'. As Roy remarks, 'this is not utopia, but nihilism'. 47 Martyrdom is therefore messianic. Consequently, the jihadist endeavour to create a new society from scratch is ultimately both nihilistic and iconoclastic. 48 From this perspective, 'Islam comes to exist universally in the places where its particularity is destroyed, the presence of its ruins on television screens bearing witness to the Muslim's universality as martyr and militant'. 49 In this apocalyptic context, Islamic State's online English-language magazine Dabiq explains the necessity of thwarting the spread of shirk. It argues that the 'conspiracy theories' of polytheism (which can be understood to mean symbols of the kuffar, 50 or non-believers) exaggerate the power of its opponents to such an extent that 'Muslims become paralyzed by analysis of current events and eventually fear the kuffār more than they fear Allah'. 51 Belief in a Manichaean battle with polytheism permeates jihadist discourse and justifies recourse to violence to prevent the spread of shirk. According to the key Islamic State text by Abu Bakr Naji, The management of savagery, 'our battle is a battle of tawhid against unbelief and faith against the spread of polytheism'. 52 This interpretation draws on the life of Muhammad, and emphasizes his destruction of the idols around the Ka'ba upon conquering Mecca.
A an interesting philosophical perspective on the appeal jihadism exerts as a political religion, and the logic of Islamic State's iconoclasm. 53 These writers observed that modern liberal, secular societies evinced a relativism which incubated, somewhat paradoxically, two varieties of nihilism. 54 The first is a brutal nihilism of the kind that led to Nazism and Marxism in Europe. Such activist ideologies seek to destroy all tradition, culture, history and ethics and replace them, as seen in the case of Warsaw, through subjugation and conquest with a new vision of a worldly utopia. The second and more docile alternative merely aspires to an aimless, post-modern, bourgeois, secularism free from serious value commitments.
55 By comparing this condition with Fred Halliday's reflection that through 'its own universalism ... Islam is a religion without overt ethnic or regional particularism, one that aspires to encompass all of humanity within its compass, and which regards other religions and traditions as, comparatively, inferior', 56 jihadism may be understood as an illiberal, 'total ideological' panacea, which 'aggregates the entirety of human existence and organization within its system'. 57 As jihadism considers everything other than authenticity as bid'a (heretical innovation), it tends towards brutal nihilism 'with its desire to forcibly replace everything other than itself ... its adherents also recoil at the "permissive egalitarianism" of contemporary societies, seeking a return to more assured-albeit absolutist-times'. 58 Ultimately, the jihadist world-view constitutes a gnostic, millennial and nihilistic, political religion. Employing the conceptual tools outlined above, it is possible to assess whether Islamic State has employed a consistent logic of iconoclasm. The remainder of this article will therefore consider three case-studies to test the logic of the iconoclasm hypothesis, namely those of Palmyra; Shi'a, Sufi and Sunni heritage; and Mosul. These separate cases will then be compared to establish whether a logic of iconoclasm or iconomachy may be confirmed.
Case-study 1: Palmyra
The city of Palmyra is located north-east of Damascus, in the Homs governorate of Syria, and dates back to the second millennium bce, being associated primarily with the Palmyrene and Roman empires. UNESCO in Syria. 59 In mid-2015 Islamic State forces captured Palmyra. Upon entering the ancient city, Islamic State identified the political capital that could be gained from destroying the ancient heritage, given the international chorus of experts calling for the preservation of such culturally important pre-Islamic sites. 60 The reasoning behind the unanimous condemnation by international experts of the destruction of heritage is complex. Marxists like Stuart Hall arguesomewhat predictably-that there is a relationship between western imperialism and heritage. Heritage, Hall contended, constitutes the material embodiment of the spirit of the nation, a collective representation of 'tradition', and hence becomes a pivotal concept in the lexicon of western virtues. 61 Moreover, heritage also implies a symbolic power to 'order, to rank, classify, and arrange, and thus to give meaning to objects and things through the imposition of interpretative schemas'. 62 Such a relationship between symbolic power and education means that, 'though strangers to one another, we form an "imagined community" because we share an idea of the nation state and what it stands for [through cultural heritage] ... identity thus depends on cultural heritage, which binds each member individually into the large national story'. 63 Henry Cleere further maintains that these notions inhabit a post-Enlightenment paradigm, where the focus moves from a 'spiritual' to a 'cultural' continuity. 64 Consequently, the appreciation of the material culture of a secular present overdetermines the heritage of a spiritual or religious past, thereby sustaining European political understandings of nationhood as well as a shared European identity. Whether or not one accepts this characterization of European self-understanding, it nevertheless is plausible to argue that the contingent promulgation of cultural continuity through the preservation of the past secures national, regional and secular identities.
This European and subsequently UN-sponsored approach to heritage might therefore be seen as transferring to other parts of the world and their heritage sites a distinctly western approach to the preservation of non-western cultures. 65 From this perspective, the significance of heritage lies in the value ascribed to it by its stakeholders. Therefore, when Islamic State degrades a cultural artefact like Palmyra, which embodies cultural values applauded by a secular western aesthetic, the assault can be seen as an attack not only on the heritage itself, but on the secular and culturally pluralist values a liberal western cosmopolitanism ascribes to it.
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Whether Islamic State understands why a western aesthetic reveres heritage is not necessarily germane to its logic of destruction. What Islamic State does appreciate, however, is that imbricating cultural heritage destruction within a wider propaganda programme advances its ideology precisely because it anathematizes the West's reverence for cultural heritage. Furthermore, the way in which Islamic State leverages territorial advantages obtained through control of cultural sites shows a degree of strategic insight. More precisely, the case of Palmyra exhibits a carefully orchestrated campaign of targeted destruction and performative showmanship.
Targeted destruction in Palmyra and the recourse to media-driven, performative showmanship
Rather than destroying Palmyra in the most efficient way possible, Islamic State almost immediately securitized the ancient ruins through measures including extensive landmining. 66 The tactical outcome was twofold: demonstrating that the ruins could, if necessary, be destroyed with ease, while also forcing government forces and coalition bombers to avoid engaging Islamic State fighters within the ancient city. Furthermore, these measures provided time and opportunity for Islamic State to conceive of a way to exploit further its already successful media campaign that had begun with the destruction of artefacts from the Mosul museum.
On 26 February 2016, Islamic State posted a video on YouTube showing the destruction of these artefacts. 67 The video sparked a heated debate on social media about what was being destroyed in the video and why. It was broadcast across the internet; screenshots appeared on the front pages of newspapers around the globe and continued to be recirculated on an unquantifiable number of outlets and platforms. 68 Harmanşah states that many consumers experienced 'visceral reactions' to the video and continued to disseminate it both to inform others and to declare 'their own cosmopolitan, humanitarian, civilized condemnation of these uncivilized acts against antiquities'. 69 The denunciation of the acts as 'uncivilized', appearing in a major archaeological journal, from the jihadist perspective merely revealed the secular and kuffar value-laden assumptions permeating the reaction to cultural destruction. Crucially, Islamic State's propaganda arm considered the success derived from the widespread propagation of its video, together with the subsequent outpouring of western disgust, a model for future campaigns of heritage destruction.
The concern that Islamic State would upon capturing Palmyra simply flatten the city proved unfounded. 70 Understanding its success in Mosul, Islamic State
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could quantify the propaganda value derived from a careful dissemination of videos. Therefore, rather than destroying large sections of the city, Islamic State slowly but systematically destroyed key heritage features, such as the Arch of Triumph, in stages, in order to maximize the media coverage and propaganda value of its actions. 71 Multiple outputs depicted the destruction of epigraphs and statues, which could have been more easily destroyed with explosives along with larger structures. Instead, Islamic State gained added symbolic value from the performance of destruction. Rather than using explosives and power tools, Islamic State's film unit depicted fighters using their hands to topple statues, or pickaxes and sledgehammers to deface them, symbolically reinforcing the narrative that they were continuing the work of Muhammad in casting out idols after conquering Mecca. Dabiq clarified the point thus:
Last month, the soldiers of the Khilāfah, with sledgehammers in hand, revived the Sunnah of their father Ibrāhīm ('alayhis-salām) when they laid waste to the shirkī legacy of a nation that had long passed from the face of the Earth. They entered the ruins of the ancient Assyrians in Wilāyat Nīnawā and demolished their statues, sculptures, and engravings of idols and kings. This caused an outcry from the enemies of the Islamic State, who were furious at losing a 'treasured heritage'. The mujāhidīn, however, were not the least bit concerned about the feelings and sentiments of the kuffār, just as Ibrāhīm was not concerned about the feelings and sentiments of his people when he destroyed their idols. With the kuffār up in arms over the large-scale destruction at the hands of the Islamic State, the actions of the mujāhidīn had not only emulated Ibrāhīm's ('alayhis-salām) destruction of the idols of his people and Prophet Muhammad's (sallallāhu 'alayhi wa sallam) destruction of the idols present around the Ka'bah when he conquered Makkah, but had also served to enrage the kuffār, a deed that in itself is beloved to Allah.
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Islamic State's representation of its iconoclastic destruction of Palmyra achieved a number of goals, ranging from the degradation of the existing fabric of society to the propagation of a nihilistic millenarianism actively preventing the spread of shirk, all transmitted via a global media platform.
Strategic leveraging
While the focus of discussion about Palmyra was on the damage to the ancient city, it would be remiss to ignore the city's importance for the supply of gas to major Syrian regions to the west. In capturing Palmyra in May 2015, Islamic State also seized a number of local gas fields. A 2016 report by the IMF estimated that 'after ISIL's seizure in early 2015 of the gas fields near Palmyra, production was projected to have fallen to 0.4 billion cubic feet per day', down from 1.1 bcfpd in 2010. org/files/islamic-state/isis-isil-islamic-state-magazine-issue+8-sharia-alone-will-rule-africa.pdf. Securing these fields afforded Islamic State significant leverage over the Syrian regime. As Isabelle Duyvesteyn noted, 'resource considerations are important factors motivating individuals to take up their weapons'. 74 The Jabal Shaer gas fields, located approximately 150 kilometres north-west of Palmyra, have been embroiled in an almost continuous battle for their control since July 2014. 75 Other gas fields such as Hail and Arak have also been centres of fighting since Islamic State began contesting control of Palmyra in 2014. The gas fields surrounding Palmyra are critical for the supply of power to key strongholds of the Syrian regime, not least Damascus. Estimates suggest that 90 per cent of Syria's electricity infrastructure relies on gas extraction. Furthermore, Palmyra acts as a transit point for pipelines carrying gas from north-eastern gas fields in Deir ez-Zor, which at the time of writing were being contested by the then newly formed Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, which has since merged with other groups to form Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham. 76 Control of these sites therefore put Islamic State in a position to apply leverage on and extract concessions from the Syrian regime. A good example of its exploitation of this leverage was the destruction in 2015 of the Furqlus pipeline, which, again, was critical to the regime's gas supply.
Before 2016, validating Islamic State's strategic leveraging of its control over vital resources was a matter of conjecture. However, in May 2016 a document by Foreign Reports Inc., a Washington-based consulting firm focusing on oil and politics in the Middle East, reported that Islamic State was turning gas from Palmyrene oil fields into fuel to be sold to the regime. 77 Analysis of leaked Islamic State files by Sky News corroborated the claim, demonstrating the existence of formal arrangements between Islamic State and the Syrian regime with regard to the transfer and exchange of resources. Furthermore, the files also suggested that Islamic State leveraged its control of resources to secure the safe withdrawal of weapons from Palmyra before the regime retook the city. 80 Islamic State's cultural destruction follows this logic closely. While the destruction of famous sites such as those of Palmyra attracts most attention in western media, its campaign of destruction is ubiquitous, and much of it does not make the headlines. This lower-key destruction feeds into the broader aim of cultural obliteration, placing territories in its grasp on a trajectory towards religious homogenization. 
Civil unrest
Despite the concerted effort to erase everything considered shirk, and to homogenize the communities under its control by eliminating any resistance, there have nevertheless been instances of civil resistance within Islamic State territories. The most serious occurred in summer 2014 with a Sha'itat tribal uprising in the town of Abu Hamam in the Syrian province of Deir ez-Zor. A 'damage density' map produced through satellite imagery by the UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) suggested that by late 2014 the city had suffered the damage or destruction of 3,112 structures. 83 While the map did not specify what had been damaged, anecdotal reports-for example, of Deir ez-Zor's Armenian Genocide Martyrs' Memorial Church being destroyed-made it reasonable to assume that Islamic State had subjected the region to a systematic pattern of violence against cultural heritage.
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In the face of such attacks, the Sha'itat tribe, estimated to have between 70,000 and 150,000 members, revolted against Islamic State's rule for reasons including, but not limited to, the destruction of villages, the imposition of sectarian rule and economic disputes. 85 What is particularly relevant in the context of the logic of iconoclasm is the manner in which the dispute escalated. A report in the Washington Post noted that as life under Islamic State became more uncompromisingly sectarian, the public whipping of a man for smoking a cigarette brought local discontent to a head. 86 The incident provoked the man's brother to shoot at a passing Islamic State patrol, killing one fighter, which led to his execution. This in turn caused an 'outpouring of rage' and the expulsion of Islamic State from the village. 87 Islamic State forces withdrew to a safe distance outside the town to await reinforcements. Once these arrived, Islamic State deployed artillery to shell the town for three consecutive days, causing catastrophic damage to the built environment. Islamic State fighters then recaptured the town, rounded up all males over the age of 15 and executed them, leading to a number of reports of mass graves holding upwards of 200 bodies. 88 Further reports by the Syrian Network for Human Rights estimated that Islamic State had displaced up to 33,000 people from the town of Abu Hamam, and issued a fatwa (an Islamic legal pronouncement) legitimizing the confiscation and destruction of property. Later it was reported that Islamic State did begin to allow residents to return to the town, but only if they agreed to a stringent list of terms and conditions. 89 While evidence of the specific destruction and targeting of cultural heritage in the Sha'itat uprising is limited, Islamic State's conduct demonstrates the workings of the strategy of iconoclasm. When viewed from a macro perspective, the intersection of different elements across time and space may be seen to create a coherent logic. Thus, the expulsion of the population, followed by a gradual return under strict terms and conditions, means that those who do return accord with Islamic State's desired demographic outcome. The sustained application of such tactics, in combination with the continual degradation of points of reference to a pre-Islamic/non-Salafi history, facilitates Islamic State's objective of forging homogeneous communities across the regions it controls. In a manner not dissimilar to the Warsaw uprising, civil unrest in places such as Deir ez-Zor illustrates that Islamic State's rule creates the conditions for civil unrest but also, in the course of its suppression, the circumstances through which the goal of cultural obliteration can be further pursued. Understanding this point enables us to arrive at a more complete understanding of the strategy of iconoclasm.
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Case-study 3: Mosul Given the relative youth of Islamic State, and the fact that most cities under its control tend to be embroiled in civil war, there have been limited opportunities for it to exhibit the reconstruction that forms the third element in the strategy of iconoclasm. There are, however, indications of what the movement intended to do, given the opportunity. The Iraqi city of Mosul offers the best example.
After the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Mosul witnessed anti-coalition and anti-government insurgencies. These were primarily associated with Al-Qaeda in Iraq, which wanted to depose 'infidels and apostates' before establishing a shari'a-governed state. 90 Historically, Mosul was considered a city 'vibrant with art, culture, coffee shops, and social events. Segregation between men and women was rare, there was no pressure, legal or social, to live according to shari'ah-leaning conservatism' 91 and the heritage of the city served as reminders to 'all Maslawis of the interconnectedness of Iraq's diverse religious populations', 92 while concurrently symbolizing 'the antithesis of sectarianism'. 93 In June 2014, following the large-scale withdrawal of US forces and the decline of the country into another round of internecine strife, Iraqi Army units abandoned the city, leaving Islamic State fighters free to consolidate their control. Initially, the capture of Mosul was thought to be a temporary setback for the Iraqi government, but the efficiency with which Islamic State secured the city saw it turn into a major defeat. Islamic State, who were ordered either to pay a heavy tax or to leave the city. Any remaining Christian heritage sites were turned into marketplaces where fighters could sell their spoils of war, or simply defaced or destroyed.
96 Islamic State's occupation of Mosul therefore demonstrated a concerted attempt to degrade the existing fabric of society by removing large sections of the population, and by removing and delegitimizing symbols associated with polytheism or Christianity.
While there are many assessments of Islamic State's theocratic new order, its use of 'soft power' and civil engineering strategies, as Aaron Zelin notes, are often overlooked. 97 Following the attempt to cleanse the city of anything not aligned with Islamic State religiosity, the movement invested in public works in order to win popular support. Although Islamic State did not promote projects to reconstruct the city of Mosul in the way the Nazis did in Warsaw, it did attempt to introduce institutions designed to reinforce a paradigmatic shift in the populace. For example, the wathiqat al-madina implemented a system that combined social services with religious indoctrination. This policy was intended to alter irreversibly the population's relationship to its intangible heritage. 98 The survival of complex cultures rests on a delicate web of factors, which, Kurin argues, include 'the freedom and desire of culture bearers, an adequate environment, a sustaining economic system, [and] a political context within which their very existence is at least tolerated'. 99 Consequently, introducing a legal system based on shari'a that did not tolerate Mosul's secular history and civic society inexorably degraded the city's existing intangible heritage, and facilitated the population's extraction from shirk.
Iconoclasm in practice
The discussion above indicates that Islamic State's approach to cultural heritage can be best understood as a strategy. Furthermore, the evidence of its operation in practice reveals that the strategy serves both pragmatic and dogmatic goals. This dichotomy highlights a paradox within Islamic State's rhetoric. While Islamic State explicitly espouses its intention to prevent the spread of shirk, and to realize tawhid, its strategy also discloses a degree of pragmatism at odds with this primary goal. If Islamic State were solely concerned with doctrinal purity, its strategy would accord dogmatically with scripture, paying little attention to any 96 material benefits derived from the control and management of cultural heritage. In this section of the article we address this paradox in the light of the case-studies examined above. Considering Islamic State's strategy in this manner enables us to determine the distinctive form of its iconoclastic logic.
Pragmatism

Clausewitz argued:
History has certainly not guided us to any recurrent forms ... it is plain that circumstances exert an influence that cuts across all general principles ... A critic has no right to rank the various styles and methods that emerge as if they were stages of excellence, subordinating one to the other. They exist side by side, and their use must be judged on its merits in each individual case.
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His appreciation of strategy is that it needs to be flexible and react meaningfully to the circumstances of the moment. To have utility, strategy has to be pragmatic, because it is 'an attempt [or threat thereof ] to make concrete a set of objectives through the application of military force to a particular case'. 101 Moreover, taking also into account the observation that war and policy are continuations of one another, it makes sense to comprehend the way in which strategies are pragmatically constructed, and subsequently implemented, to achieve desired ends. Furthermore, Clausewitz maintained that striking at the Schwerpunkt, or the 'centre of gravity', provides one of the clearest routes to victory. 102 An enemy's centre of gravity is variable and can be what matters to an opponent, or what you make matter to an opponent, but it is most often associated with the capture of the enemy's capital or the defeat of its main armies in battle. The point is, however, that it is a pragmatic consideration that connects military operations to political outcomes.
Islamic State's targeting of the Syrian regime's perceived centre of gravity demonstrates the pragmatic nature of its strategy. Simpson notes: 'The capture of a fortress, for example, may be of no military significance ... but may be significant as a prize in wars fought for more limited political advantage.' 103 Palmyra represents just such a pragmatic lever, offering an opportunity to gain a political advantage over an opponent through their centre of gravity. As has been pointed out, the Syrian capital, Damascus, is almost wholly reliant upon either the gas extracted in the fields surrounding Palmyra or the gas piped through the region from Syria's eastern provinces. Moreover, the Syrian regime has been locked in a battle with rebel forces in Damascus since the start of the civil war, drawing on support from Iranian and Hezbollah forces to maintain a degree of control. Second, a strategy of iconoclasm requires the removal of all reference to the previous society. Arguably, this is the most important aspect of iconoclasm, for it acts as the bridge between ideology and practice, and is often exhibited in attempts to destroy the heterogeneity of the population. The ideology of Islamic State maintains that it is not merely acceptable to destroy heritage but that it is positively desirable in order to prevent the spread of unbelief. Islamic State's occupation techniques clearly demonstrate coordinated efforts to destroy pre-existing social structures. This is exemplified in the campaign of cultural destruction seen in the latter part of 2014 in Iraq. These assaults were, on the whole, not undertaken to gain a military advantage. Indeed, the stated intention to attack the al-Askari shrine proved wholly counterproductive from a military perspective. Instead, such attacks were designed to alter the demographic composition of the population and the built environment. Mosul represents a good example. The capture of this formerly pluralistic, secular city saw Islamic State attempting to break down heterogeneous communities, established over generations, by making clear that any lifestyle not in accordance with shari'a was repugnant and would be punished.
The final element in the logic of iconoclasm is the attempt to reconstruct society in a manner consistent with the new order. The wathiqat al-madina promulgated for Mosul suggests how Islamic State envisioned cities under its control should be governed. In practice, as its occupation of Mosul shows, its sought to push the population towards an ultra-conservative orthodoxy by introducing institutions, such as shari'a courts and religious lectures, that reinforce this paradigm shift. The response to the civil uprisings by the Sha'itat tribe in Deir ez-Zor region further International Affairs 93: 5, 2017 illustrates this intention. The ferocity of Islamic State's reaction to the challenge to its authority not only shocked the tribe into submission but also enabled Islamic State to expel large numbers of people from their homes, allowing the return only of those who agreed to live under a strictly defined code of shari'a. Islamic State's purpose in each case was to recreate society and to align the social and physical environment with its scriptural certitudes.
Conclusion
The destruction of heritage in Iraq and Syria by Islamic State is often interpreted as a challenge to secular western notions of culture and tradition. These actions are in consequence frequently denounced as barbaric. While this response is understandable, the analysis presented here has shown that such denunciations obscure the intent underlying the strategy of Islamic State. The events in Iraq and Syria are, moreover, by no means unprecedented. Rather, they fit within the conceptual boundaries of iconoclasm identified in conflicts such as those of the 1990s in the Balkans and earlier in the Second World War. In this context, Islamic State's iconoclasm is a logical counterpart to its aestheticization of extreme violence. Both are intended to induce a sense of hopelessness in its adversaries, and are recorded in videos and disseminated across the internet.
Even so, it may also be argued that Islamic State's iconoclasm is failing. At the time of writing, the group has lost both territory and fighters.
132 If-or when-its own 'capital' in Raqqa falls, it may retreat into the shadow world of a clandestine jihadist network instead of functioning as a quasi-political entity with a monopoly on violence in a territorial unit of rule.
Nonetheless, Islamic State's ability to seize and hold territory for several years attests to its effectiveness. No doubt a variety of factors, such as Sunni anger at the Iraqi government's sectarian rule, and the collapse of central authority in Syria following the country's descent into civil war, contributed to its initial success.
Overall, this study has not sought to assess the efficacy of Islamic State's cultural destruction per se, but rather to understand its instrumentalization, and to this end has employed the precepts of strategic theory. Clausewitz may seem an unusual figure to introduce into an analysis of cultural heritage, but his thinking remains pertinent. One of his most acute observations is that the outcome of conflict is never final because those who have been defeated often consider their loss transitory. To achieve a final victory, the mind of the opponent must be subjugated. Conquering the mind cannot, however, be achieved purely by military force. Instead, it requires manipulating an opponent into recognizing that any further resistance to the new regime will be futile. This article has demonstrated that attempts to conquer the mind by targeting the built environment are evident in Islamic State's strategic approach.
